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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WAR CLAUSES IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
The right of a beneficiary to recover on an insurance policy, containing a
clause which exempts an insurer from liability in case the insured "engages in
military or naval service in time of war without the consent in writing of an executive officer of the company", promises to be the subject of much litigation
within the next few years. The Pennsylvania statute of 1921 regarding this
reads as follows:'
"No policy of life or endowment insurance, except policies of industrial insurance where the premiums are payable monthly or
oftener, shall be issued or delivered by any stock or mutual life insurance company in this commonwealth unless it contains, in substance, the following provisions:
(e) "A provision that the policy shall be incontestable after it has
been in force, during the lifetime of the insured, two years
from its date of issue, except for non-payment of premiums,
and for engaging in military or naval service in time of war
without the consent in writing of an executive officer of the
company.
I.

Validity of Such Provision.

The question of the validity of such a provision was raised in numerous
cases after the first World War on the ground that an exemption clause of this
character was against public policy in that it deters enlistments in the Army and
Navy and hampers the government in its war activities. Such a contention, however, has not been sustained in the decisions of the courts, and was specifically
2
rejected in the case of Keininger v. Home Life Insurance Co. of America,
where the court said:
"We find no sufficient reason for declaring void as against public
policy provisions in contracts of insurance excluding therefrom the
hazards incident to military service in time of war, or, what is the
same thing, exacting a higher rate of premium for such risk."
See also Millen v. Ill. Bankers' Life Ass'n.3 and Redd v. Amer. Central
Life Insurance Co. 4 Clearly the Pennsylvania statute could not be hld invalid
on this ground.
II.

Commencement of the Period.

A person is held to have entered the military service when he has passed
the examination, taken the oath, been enrolled, and become subject to the orders

lAct of 1921, P.L. 682, Art. 4, Sec. 40; 40 PS 510(e).

23 Pa. D. & C. III, (Pa. 1923).
3138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310 (1919).
4200 Mo.App. 383, 207 S.W. 74 (1919).
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of the military authorities.6 The limitation of the liability applies equally to persons inducted into the military service under the Selective Service Act, as to
6
those who voluntarily enlist in the service.
III.

Characterand Nature of Risks Contemplated.
In the case of Redd v. Amer. Cent. Life Ins. Co., supra, it was said, "That

service in the military forces in the time of war is a somewhat hazardous occupation must be admitted. The fact that the government enters largely into war
risk insurance, doubtless at large expense and loss, was due, in part at least, to
the fact that insurance companies were not willing to, and doubtless could not,
except at a considerable increase in rates."
How-ever the decisions construing provisions excluding full liability in cases
where the insured engaged in military or naval service are not in harmony where
an insured has died from disease or accident at a military camp before engaging
in actual active combat service. Some of this conflict among the cases may be
explained by noting the differences in phraseology of such provisions in the
policies.
IV.

Causation v. Status.

In Benham v. Amer. Cent. Life Ins. Co.,' the following "war dause" was
incorporated into the policy:
"It should be incontestable except for violation of its provisions as
to military or naval service in time of war, or in consequence of
such service."
The court interpreted the clause as meaning, "death while doing, performing, or
taking part in some military service in time of war," and held it inoperative
where the insured enlisted man died from influenza in a Dallas hospital. The
court here went to great length to define the word "engage" in the sense of
action, or to take part in, much the same as an officer engaged in the discharge
of his official duties. The court fortified its construction by emphasizing the last
phrase of the clause, viz., "or in consequence of such service", and concluded
that the death of the insured by influenza was not a hazard peculiar to those
engaged in military service, during an epidemic which swept the country during
that period.
In the case of Nutt v. Security Life Ins. Co.,' the policy contested contained

a provision that after a year it should be incontestable, "except for naval or military service in time of war without a permit," and that, "In case of death while
engaged in such service without a permit," the amount payable should be only
5Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920); Reid v. Amer. Nat.
Assur.6 Co., 204 Mo. 643, 218 S.W. 957 (1920).
Bradshaw v. Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 170 Kan. 681, 193 Pac. 332 (1920).
7140 Ark. 612, 217 S.W. 642 (1920).
8142 Ark. 29, 218 S.W. 675 (1920).
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the reserve value. The court construed the clause not to mean the death of the
insured during the time he was in the army, but to mean death resulting from
-war activities".
In Boatwright v. Amer. Life Ins. Co.,9 it was held that the insured at the

time of his death was not "engaged in military or naval service in time of war",
within the meaning of the exemption provision of the policy sued on, where he
enlisted in the Navy and died of influenza while located at the Great Lakes
Naval Training Station at a time when the disease was prevalent throughout the
United States, and was common to civilians as well as enlisted men.
Also in the case of Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 10 the policy provided
that:
. . in case of death of the insured, while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war, the beneficiary would accept in
full settlement a sum equal to the premiums paid."
Here it was held that the insurer was liable for the face of the policy upon its
appearing that the insured, although he enlisted in the Navy prior to the signing
of the Armistice, died after the signing from influenza while he was home on a
furlough. A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Rex Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pettiford.1n

A contrasting view was taken in the case of Bradshaw v. Farmer's and
Banker's Life Ins. Co., supra, where the policy contained a clause similar to that
set forth in the Pennsylvania statute. In that case the insured had been inducted
into the Army under the Selective Service Act and was acting as chief blacksmith
in a training camp and died of pneumonia. The court held, in effect, that:
... the agreement limiting the liability of the insurer where the
insured engaged in military service was one that the parties had a
right to make, that such provision was binding on both of them,
and that the extent of the liability of the insurer on the policy was
the amount of the premiums paid thereon."
Also in Slaughter v. Protective League Ins. Co.,12 it was held that under
such a clause the only condition required to create the exemption was that the
insured be engaged in naval or military service in the time of war. Here the
court refused to make the close distinction in regard to the word "engaged"
which was adopted in the case of Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co.,
supra. Other cases holding similarly are Sandstedt v. Amer. Cent. Life Ins.
14
Co. 13 and Reid v. American Nat. Assurance Co.
9191 Iowa 253, 180 N.W. 321 (1920).
10225 S.W. 106 (Mo. App., 1920).
1174 Ind. App. 507, 129 N.E. 248 (1920).
12205 Mo. App. 352, 233 S.W. 819 (1920).
13109 Wash. 338, 186 Pac. 1069 (1920).
14204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S.W. 957 (1920).
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In the case of Keininger v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America,16 the policy
contained the following clause:
"If the insured shall engage in any military or naval service in time
of war, the liability of the company in event of the death of the insured while so engaged, or within six months thereafter, will be
limited to the amount of the legal reserve to the credit of the policy
less any indebtedness to the company herein: unless before engaging in such service, or within one month (of not less than 30 days)
or at the time of paying the first premium thereon, if the insured
shall be then so engaged, the insured shall pay to the company at
its executive office in Philadelphia such extra premiums as may be
required by the company, and in like manner shall pay annually
thereafter on each anniversary of this policy, or within one month
(of not less than 30 days) while the insured shall continue to be
so engaged, such extra premiums as may be required by the company.

The insured was drafted into the army under the Selective Service Act, but did
not notify the company of his change of status, as required under the terms of
the policy, nor did he pay any additional premiums. The insured died in France,
while with the American Expeditionary Force, from acute rheumatism. The
court held:
.. . that the clause (supra) is free from ambiguity, and expressed
in clear and distinct language. It is not limited to the case of an
insured, who participates in a military engagement or battle, but becomes applicable if the insured engages in any military service in
time of war."
The case of McCahey v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co."6 would seem
at first blush to be contrary to the Keininger case, but it is distinguishable on its
facts in that there the insurer and the insured had placed a different interpretation on the "war clause" in the policy; the applicant was a member of the
United States Marine Corps, stationed at Quantico, Va. This fact appeared on
the application upon which the policy was issued, and war had already been declared against the Central Powers. The policy contained the following clause:
"The liability of the company during the first policy year shall be
limited to the premiums.paid, if he shall die during said year as a
result of military or naval service in time of war.
Subsequently the insurer notified the insured by mail, "Should you receive orders
involving service whereby you may be subject to the casualties of war or disease
incumbent thereto, whether at sea or on land, you may obtain a war permit immediately by notifying us by mail or telegraph." Shortly thereafter the insured
was accidentally killed by the accidental discharge of a revolver, while still located at the Quantico, Va., training station. The court permitted recovery for the
153 Pa. D. & C. 111 (1923).
1627 Pa. Dist. 603 (1918).
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face value of the policy, and in the course of the opinion stated:
"Where there is a doubt arising as to the meaning of any words
incorporated into an insurance policy, when applied to specific
facts, or where the words are capable of two interpretations, the
courts have uniformly adopted the one which is most favorable to
the insured, and have construed the policy most strongly against the
insurer."
Other cases setting forth this principle are Humphreys v. National Benefit
Ass'n.17 and Bole v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co.' 8
V.

Waiver or Estoppel.

Where the doctrines of waiver or estoppel have been applied in insurance
contests, the cases have been largely those where the insurance companies have
relied on a forfeiture of the contract, asserting breach of the warranties and conditions to work such forfeitures. In many cases the courts have held that if the
companies have l-d the other party, to his prejudice and expense, to understand
that such forfeitures would not be insisted upon, then the company would be
estopped from asserting such defenses. Also in cases where at the time of issuing the policy, the insurer knows that one or more of its conditions are inconsistent with the facts, and the insured is guilty of no fraud, the insurer is
estopped from subsequently setting up those facts as a breach.1" Furthermore,
the courts are always prompt to seize hold of any circumstance to indicate an
election to waive a forfeiture, or an agreement to do so, on which the insured
20
has relied and acted.
In these war risk cases, the defendant insurance company does not claim a
forfeiture of the contract; on the contrary, it is insisting upon the contract itself
and asserting that by its terms it did not insure the deceased when engaged in
military service in time of war. So it has been held that where the policy must
contain all the contract, such a clause cannot be waived by the agent, but must
be done by a duly authorized officer of the company, as was done in McCahey
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra.22 Such waiver or estoppel cannot
be maintained on the grounds that the company accepted premiums with 2s or
without 2 ' knowledge of the fact that the insured was in the military service.

17139 Pa. 264, 20 A. 1047 (1891).
18159 Pa. 53, 28 A. 205 (1893).
19Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 53 Pa. 353 (1866).
20Magarge v. Ins. Co., 97 Pa. 15 (1891) ; Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins.Co., 209 Mich. 638,
177 N.W. 242 (1920).
21209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920).
22For similar holdings, see Caldwell v. Ill. Bank Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W. 747 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921) ; Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v.Richardson, 151 Ark. 231, 236 S.W. 278 (1920).
28Reid v. Amer. Nat. Assur. Co., 204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S.W. 957 (1920).
24Millen v. Ill. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310 (1919).
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War Clause in Present Policies.

In a standard life insurance policy, issued by one of the larger companies,
there is contained a clause providing for additional benefits in the event of death
by accidental means. This clause excepts from its operation accidental deaths occurring under certain circumstances, among which is the following, viz: "No
such benefit shall be payable if such death results (d) while a member of the
military, naval or air forces of any country at war (declared or undeclared)."
Following is a copy of the War Clause which has been incorporated into some
life insurance policies since January 1, 1942:
It is hereby provided that, notwithstanding anything in this
Policy to the contrary, the liability of the Company shall be limited
to the amount specified below if the Insured dies:
(A)
As a result of military or naval service in the forces of
a nation at war, whether declared or undeclared, should death occur during such service or within six months after discharge; or
(B)
As a result of operating or riding in any kind of aircraft, except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled passenger
flight of a commercial aircraft.
In the event of such death the full liability of the Company
under this Policy shall be the amount of premiums paid less any
dividends apportioned and credited, together with compound interest at the rate of 3 per cent, per annum, plus any dividends left to
accumulate and the reserve on any paid-up additions, and less any
indebtedness on this Policy. Such liability shall not, however, exceed the amount that would be payable in the absence of this provision, nor be less than the insurance reserve on this Policy (including the reserve on any paid-up additions) plus any dividends
left to accumulate and less any indebtedness on this Policy.
If this Policy contains provision for a benefit in event of death
by accidental means, such provision is not altered by this rider.
If this Policy contains provisions for benefits in the event of
total and permanent disability, such benefits shall not be allowed
if disability results from disease originating or bodily injury occurring while in military or naval service in the forces of a nation at
war, declared or undeclared, or from operating or riding in any
kind of aircraft except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled passenger flight of a commercial aircraft.
These provisions shall also apply to any reduced paid-up insurance put in force in accordance with the Non-forfeiture Provisions,
if any, contained in this Policy, and shall be included in any policy
to which this Policy may be changed or converted.
It will be noticed that under the clause providing for additional benefits in the
case of accidental death, and also in the paragraph (B) of the war clause covering total and permanent disability, the phrases "while in" and "while a member
of" the military or naval service of a nation at war are utilized. Compare with
these phrases the phrase "as a result of" military or naval service in the forces
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of a nation at war, which is utilized in paragraph (A) of the war clause, and
which applies to the liability of the insurer, in the case of death of the insured,
for the face value of the policy. In the light of the cases, previously discussed,
and also in consideration of the fact that this different phraseology appears in
the same policy, it is reasonable to presume that the insurer contracts for a different liability where these first two phrases appear, than where the latter is
used. In the case of Keininger v. Home Life Ins. Co. 2 5 the phrase, "Shall engage in any military or naval service," is interpreted as not being limited to the
case where the insured participates in a military engagement or battle, but as becoming applicable if the insured becomes a member of the armed forces of a
nation in time of war. On the other hand where the phrase, "As a result of
military or naval service in the forces of a nation at war," is used, we have as
authority the case of McCahey v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.2 6 which
held the phrase to mean "death while doing, performing, or taking part in some
military engagement." There is another interesting question arising here as to
the status of members of the Home Defense Corps under these policies, where
they are engaged in fighting fires, or manning anti-aircraft guns, or perhaps engaged in bomb-demolition squads. Since it would be impossible to anticipate the
construction of these different "war clauses" being utilized in the policies, and
since, as pointed out in this article, an interpretation by an agent is not binding
on the insurance company, it would seem that in cases of doubt the only way to
ascertain the extent of protection would be by an official interpretation by an
executive officer of the company.
CONCLUSION

It is not the intention of the author of this article to infer or speculate
whether or not the insurance companies will pay under the policies now in force,
but whether or not, under the construction of these clauses by the courts, the
actual liability of the insurer exists when an insured dies or is killed while in
the military or naval service in time of war.

J.
22 5Supra, note 2.

6Supra, note 16.
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